Research Log - 2026-05-03 - Core SBAS Claim Routing Skip FAA
Scope
This log records the ten-cycle core SBAS solidification pass requested on 2026-05-03.
User constraints:
- Documentation quality must be institutional grade.
- Overlapping knowledge is forbidden.
- Claims must be validated/authenticated against original or authoritative sources.
- The pass should prioritize core SBAS knowledge.
- Long reference-website expansion should be skipped.
- FAA-specific extraction should be skipped.
Source posture
No new long reference-website expansion was performed in this pass. The work used existing source anchors and source-family routing already present in the vault, especially:
- Source - ICAO Annex 10 Volume I GNSS SBAS
- Source - ICAO Doc 9849
- Source - RTCA DO-229
- Source - EASA ETSO-C145e and ETSO-C146e
- Source - ICAO PANS-OPS Doc 8168 and Doc 9613 PBN Manual
- Source - SBAS Service Providers
- SBAS Standards Source Matrix
- SBAS Operational Validation Dashboard
Existing FAA-related notes were not deleted because they are part of the historical source-routing graph, but this cycle did not deepen FAA TSO, procedure-design, NFDC, WAAS, or other FAA-specific extraction.
Core routing added
Created SBAS Core Claim Routing as the institutional routing note for core concept claims.
The note separates the following claim families:
| Claim family | Owner note | Boundary |
|---|---|---|
| Definition and beginner orientation | What is SBAS | High-level explanation only |
| Architecture | SBAS Architecture / SBAS Architecture Flow | System chain only; no detailed standards values |
| Signal/message flow | SBAS Signal and Message Flow | Flow explanation only; no message-number or bit-field claims |
| Correction versus integrity | SBAS Corrections and Integrity Separation | Accuracy support is not operational safety approval |
| Ground/airborne responsibility | SBAS Ground Segment and Airborne Receiver Responsibilities | Service, receiver, procedure, aircraft, and operator layers remain separate |
| Integrity/protection/alerting | SBAS Integrity, Protection Levels, Alert Limits | Relationships only; no unsupported numerical thresholds |
| Operational validation | SBAS Operational Validation Dashboard | Escalation path only; not original evidence |
Core notes created
- SBAS Signal and Message Flow
- SBAS Corrections and Integrity Separation
- SBAS Ground Segment and Airborne Receiver Responsibilities
- SBAS Core Claim Routing
Existing core notes hardened
- What is SBAS
- SBAS Architecture
- SBAS Architecture Flow
- SBAS-Terminology
- SBAS Integrity
- Protection Levels
- Alert Limits
- Ionospheric Model Validation
- Total Electron Content (TEC)
- SBAS MOC
- SBAS Standards Source Matrix
- SBAS Source Backlog
Non-overlap rules established
- Core concept notes explain relationships; they do not own detailed standards text.
- Standards source notes own evidence provenance and source-family boundaries.
- Service-provider notes own provider-specific identity and bounded service/development signals.
- The operational validation dashboard owns the escalation ladder from service-provider evidence to regulator, ANSP, AIP, procedure, aircraft, and operator evidence.
- Numerical alerting, protection-level, message, and operational values remain blocked until direct primary-source extraction supports them.
Deferred work
- Direct Annex 10 extraction remains the highest-value core standards task.
- Direct DO-229 extraction remains required before receiver/message/protection-level details can be published as verified requirements.
- Direct Doc 9849 extraction remains required before state-implementation guidance can be treated as fully verified.
- Non-FAA operational validation can proceed for EGNOS, GAGAN, MSAS, KASS, BDSBAS, SouthPAN, and SDCM where official regulator/AIP/service-performance sources are available.